This paper analyzes the value of communication in the implementation of monetary policy. The central bank is uncertain about the current state of the economy. Households and …rms do not have a complete economic model of the determination of aggregate variables, including nominal interest rates, and must learn about their dynamics using historical data. When the central bank implements optimal policy, the Taylor principle is not su¢ cient for macroeconomic stability: for all reasonable parameterizations self-ful…lling expectations are possible. To mitigate this instability, three communication strategies are contemplated: i) communicating the precise details of the monetary policy -that is, the variables and coe¢ cients; ii) communicating just the variables on which monetary policy decisions are conditioned; and iii) communicating the in ‡ation target. The …rst two strategies restore the Taylor principle as a su¢ cient condition for stabilizing expectations. In contrast, in economies with persistent shocks, communicating the in ‡ation target fails to protect against expectations driven ‡uctuations. These results underscore the importance of communicating the systematic component of current and future monetary policy decisions: announcing an in ‡ation target is not enough to stabilize expecations -one must also announce how this target will be achieved.
Introduction
Since the 1990's, central banking practice has shifted from secrecy and opaqueness towards greater transparency about monetary policy strategy and objectives. At the same time, an increasing number of central banks have adopted an in ‡ation targeting framework for monetary policy. One potential bene…t from a successful implementation of in ‡ation targeting is the anchoring of expectations, with its stabilizing e¤ect on macroeconomic activity. Failing to anchor expectations might result in undesired ‡uctuations and economic instability. Motivated by Friedman (1968) , communication is given content by introducing two informational frictions. First, the central bank has imperfect information about the current state and must therefore forecast the current in ‡ation rate and output gap when contemplating its setting for the nominal interest rate in any period. Policy therefore responds to information and the state of the economy with a delay and is implementable in the sense of McCallum (1999) -see also Orphanides (2003) . Second, households and …rms have an incomplete model of the macroeconomy, knowing only their own objectives, constraints and beliefs. An immediate implication is that they do not have a model of how aggregate state variables are determined, including nominal interest rates. They therefore forecast these exogenous quan-tities relevant to their decision problems by extrapolating from historical patterns in observed data. Such beliefs capture uncertainty about the future path of nominal interest rates that is not present in a rational expectations analysis of the model and creates a delay in the transmission of monetary policy: because beliefs take time to adjusted to new information, policy changes a¤ect the macroeconomy only gradually. These two frictions combined present a challenge for stabilization policy and formed the basis of Friedman (1968) critique of nominal interest rate rules as a means to implement monetary policy. 1 Under these assumptions, households and …rms do not know the policy rule adopted by the central bank. Agents attempt to infer the reduced-form dynamics of nominal interest rates using historical data and simple statistical models. Communication is then modeled as agents having certain types of information about how the central bank determines its nominal interest rate setting. Worth underscoring is that uncertainty about the path of nominal interest rates is only one of several sources of uncertainty present in this economy. Indeed, households and …rms are similarly unsure about how aggregate output and in ‡ation are determined. The central question is whether uncertainty about the determination of interest rates is an especially important source of uncertainty and whether additional knowledge about the future path of nominal interest rates helps anchor expectations, assisting macroeconomic stabilization.
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The benchmark communication strategy is one in which the central bank discloses under full credibility the policy rule employed to set nominal interest rates. Agents therefore know which variables appear in the policy rule and the precise restriction that holds between these endogenous variables at all points in time in the forecast horizon. An alternative interpretation of this communication strategy is the bank discloses its forecasts of the entire future path of its policy instrument. A consequence of knowing the policy rule is that agents need not independently forecast the path of nominal interest rates -it is su¢ cient to forecast the set of variables upon which nominal interest rates depend. Because this relation is one of the many equilibrium restrictions agents are attempting to learn, by imposing this restriction on their regression model a more e¢ cient forecast obtains.
The second communication strategy reduces the information made available about policy deliberations relative to the previous full-information case. Rather than convey the precise policy rule, the central bank only announces the set of variables on which nominal interest rates are conditioned. Hence, while in the benchmark communication strategy agents know both the variables and the coe¢ cients of the policy rule, this second strategy only informs the public about the former. This strategy might re ‡ect partial central bank credibility or the inability to accurately communicate the complexities of the decision making process: market participants use available data and the information about the policy rule to verify the reaction function that is used to set the nominal interest rate.
Finally, motivated by the in ‡ation targeting literature which emphasizes the bene…ts of announcing a target for the in ‡ation rate for anchoring in ‡ation expectations, we explore the advantages of only communicating the central bank's desired average outcomes for in ‡ation, nominal interest rates and the output gap. Here the only information that is communicated is the central bank's commitment to conduct policy in such a way as to achieve the target for in ‡ation on average. No information on how the central bank will achieve this objective is given.
The central results are as follows. First, in the case of no communication, policy rules that implement optimal policy under rational expectations frequently lead to self-ful…lling expectations. An aggressive response to in ‡ation expectations -as adherence to the Taylor principle prescribes -does not guarantee stability. On the contrary, it is likely to further destabilize expectations. Importantly the Taylor principle is not su¢ cient for stability under learning dynamics in contrast to a rational expectations analysis of the model. Second, communicating the entire policy decision process -that is, the relevant conditioning variables and policy coe¢ cients -mitigates instability and allows successful implementation of optimal policy by stabilizing expectations. Hence, communicating accurate information about the systematic component of current and future monetary policy decisions anchors expectations and promotes macroeconomic stability. Since our approach to mod-eling household and …rm beliefs represent a small departure from the rational expectations assumption -indeed this assumption is nested as a special limiting case -this result underscores the value of communication. These stabilization bene…ts can also be fully captured by a communication strategy that only conveys the set of endogenous variables on which monetary policy decisions are conditioned. This information, combined with knowledge that nominal interest rates are a linear function of these objects, delivers convergence to rational expectations equilibrium and protects against expectations driven instability.
Furthermore we show the importance of incomplete information for the role of communication. We demonstrate that if the central bank has perfect information about the state of the economy, then communication is not required for expectations stabilization. Indeed, policy conditioned on the current in ‡ation rate and output gap restores the Taylor principle. Because the central bank promptly responds to contemporaneous developments in the economy, large departures of expectations from equilibrium values are prevented. Thus it is the interaction of the two frictions that leads to instability. However, in practice the current state will never be accurately observed, making transparency and communication of monetary policy desirable.
Third, communication strategies that only announce an in ‡ation target and the associated average long-run values of the nominal interest rate and output gap frequently lead to expectations driven instability. In an economy with persistent shocks, the conditions for convergence are identical to those for the benchmark no communication case where these quantities must be learned. Hence, in such economies, communicating the in ‡ation target does little to help anchor expectations. Combined with the full-information communication result, it is clear that communication helps by providing information about the systematic component of policy and importantly by giving information on how the central bank intends to achieve its announced objectives. Credibility about the future conduct of policy matters not only because of stabilization bias that emerges from a rational expectations equilibrium analysis, as is well known from Kydland and Prescott (1977) , but also because it helps protect against departures from rational expectations equilibrium that arise from small expectational errors on the part of households and …rms. This …nding has relevance for Orphanides and Williams (2005) which presents a model in which announcing the in ‡ation target achieves a better in ‡ation-output trade-o¤. Because this reduces the amplitude of macroeconomic ‡uctuations the announcement of the in ‡ation target is welfare enhancing. However, in their model, regardless of whether or not the in ‡ation target is announced, expectations are well anchored: self-ful…lling expectations cannot arise.
The improvement in welfare results from agents having a more accurate forecast of future policy decisions. In contrast, this paper presents a model in which self-ful…lling expectations emerge even if the in ‡ation target is announced and credible.
Related Literature: Geraats (2002) proposes …ve central aspects of central bank transparency: political, operational, procedural, economic, policy. The present analysis focuses on the bene…ts from communication of the goals of policy and the policy strategy adopted to achieve such goals. In the context of our model, this information is embodied in the policy rule adopted by the central bank. The analysis builds on an earlier literature commencing with Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) and more recently Faust and Svensson (2001) . These papers consider two period models in which the central bank has an idiosyncratic employment target which is imperfectly observed by the public. Fluctuations in this target leads to central bank temptation to deviate from pre-announce in ‡ation goals. However, increased transparency allows the private sector to observe the employment target with greater precision and therefore raises the costs to the central bank of deviating from its announced objectives. Transparency is therefore desirable as it provides a commitment mechanism. Svensson (1999) further argues on the ground of this result that for in ‡ation targeting central banks it is generally desirable for detailed information on policy objectives, including forecasts, to be published. Such transparency enhances the public's understanding of the monetary policy process and raises the costs to a central bank from deviating from its stated objectives.
More recently, a literature has emerged focusing on the question of whether transparency of central bank forecasts of state variables is desirable. In these models, the public correctly understands central bank preferences but has imperfect information about the central bank's forecast of the aggregate state. Building on Morris and Shin (2002) , Amato and Shin (2003) , Hellwig (2005) and Walsh (2006) , among others, show that full transparency about the central bank forecast is not always desirable because private agents may overreact to noisy public signals and under react to more accurate private information. More generally, Geraats (2002, 2006) argues that models based on diverse private information often have the property that pronouncements by the central bank may lead to frequent shifts in expectations leading to increased economic volatility.
On the other hand, Roca (2006) shows that some of these conclusions depend on the postulated objectives of the central bank. Similarly, Svensson (2006) and Woodford (2005) argue that the conclusions of Morris and Shin (2002) depend on implausible parameter assumptions. The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 delineates a simple model of the macroeconomy. Section 3 details private agents'expectations formation and the adopted criterion to assess macroeconomic stability. Section 4 provides results. Section 5 provides graphical analysis of the role of communication in stabilizing expectations. Section 6 concludes.
3 See also the latter for a review of the bene…ts of central bank communication and transparancy. 4 Rudebusch and Williams (forthcoming) present an analysis that is similar in spirit, analyzing the consequences of asymmetric information about future policy actions. One of the constributions of our paper is to build on their analysis by developing microfoundations that are consistent with this assumption.
A Simple Model
The following section details a simple model of output gap and in ‡ation determination that is similar in spirit to Svensson and Woodford (2005) . The major di¤erences are the incorporation of heterogeneous agents, non-rational beliefs, and the assumption of Rotemberg (1982) price setting rather than Calvo (1983) price setting as implemented by Yun (1996) . The analysis follows Marcet and Sargent (1989a) and Preston (2005) , solving for optimal decisions conditional on current beliefs.
Microfoundations
Households. Households maximize their intertemporal utility derived from consumption and leisureÊ
subject to the ‡ow budget constraint
where B i t denotes holdings of the one period riskless bond, R t denotes the gross interest paid on the bond, W t the nominal wage and h i t labor supplied by household i. Financial markets are assumed to be incomplete and t denotes pro…ts from holding shares in an equal part of each …rm. The nominal income in any period t is therefore P t Y i t = W t h i t +P t t .Ê i t denote the beliefs at time t held by each household i; which satisfy standard probability laws. Section 3 describes the precise form of these beliefs and the information set available to agents in forming expectations. However, two points are worth noting. First, in forming expectations, households and …rms observe only their own objectives, constraints and realizations of aggregate variables. They have no knowledge of the beliefs, constraints and objectives of other agents in the economy: in consequence agents are heterogeneous in their information sets.
Second, given the assumed conditioning information for expectations formation, consumption plans are made one period in advance and therefore predetermined. Each household consumes a composite good
which is made of a continuum of di¤erentiated goods, each produced by a monopolistically competitive …rm j. The elasticity of substitution among di¤erentiated goods, t , is timevarying, with E [ t ] = > 1. This is a simple way of modeling time-varying mark-ups, introducing a trade-o¤ between in ‡ation and output stabilization relevant to optimal policy design.
A log linear approximation to the …rst order conditions of the household problem provides the household Euler equationĈ
and the intertemporal budget constraint
and z denotes the steady state value of any variable z.
Solving the Euler equation recursively backwards, taking expectations at time t 1 and substituting into the intertemporal budget constraint giveŝ
Optimal consumption decisions depend on current wealth and on the expected future path of income and the real interest rate. 6 The optimal allocation rule is analogous to permanent making the alternative assumption that the central bank has a policy reaction function that responds to one period ahead expectations of in ‡ation. All results contunue to hold. 6 Using the fact that total household income is the sum of dividend and wage income, combined with the …rst order conditions for labor supply and consumption, would deliver a decision rule for consumption that depends only on forecasts of prices: that is, goods prices, nominal interest rates, wages and dividends. However, we make the simiplify assumption that households forecast total income, the sum of divdend payments and wages received.
income theory, with di¤erences emerging from allowing variations in the real rate of interest, which can occur due to either variations in the nominal interest rate or in ‡ation.
Firms. There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive …rms. Each di¤erentiated consumption good is produced according to the linear production function
where A t denotes a technology shock. Each …rm chooses a price P jt in order to maximize its expected discounted value of pro…tsÊ
denotes period pro…ts and the quadratic term the cost of adjusting prices as in Rotemberg (1982) . 7 Given the incomplete markets assumption it is assumed that …rms value future pro…ts according to the marginal rate of substitution evaluated at aggregate income
The precise details of this assumption are not important to the ensuing analysis so long as in the log linear approximation future pro…ts are discounted at the rate T t .
The intratemporal consumer problem implies aggregate demand for each di¤erentiated good is
where Y t denotes aggregate output and
is the associated price index. Summing up, the …rm chooses a sequence for P jt to maximize pro…ts, given the constraint that demand should be satis…ed at the posted price, taking as 7 The results are similar to the case of a Calvo pricing model.
given P t , Y t ; and W t . Again, given the information upon which expectations are conditioned, prices are determined one period in advance.
In a symmetric equilibrium, all …rms set the same price, so that p t (j) = P t . Log-linearizing the …rst order condition for the optimal price we obtain
where,P t = log P t , = Y = is inversely related to the cost of adjusting the prices, t = t ( t 1) 1 denotes the mark-up andŝ t ln (s t = s) and^ t ln ( t = ). Solving forward and making use of the transversality condition we obtain
which states that each …rm's current price depends on the expected future path of real marginal costs and cost-push shocks.
The real marginal cost function is
where the second equality comes from the household's labor supply decision. After loglinearization we obtainŝ t =Ĉ t â t so that current prices depend on expected future demand and technology. The responsiveness of current prices to changes in expected demand depends on the degree of nominal rigidity. A low degree of nominal rigidity implies a high value of (corresponding to a low value of the cost ): in this case …rms respond aggressively to changes in perceived demand because price changes are less costly. The opposite occurs in the case of higher costs of price adjustment.
The degree of price rigidity plays a key role in the stability analysis.
Market clearing, e¢ cient output and aggregate dynamics
The model is closed with assumptions on monetary and …scal policy. The …scal authority is assumed to follow a zero debt policy in every period t. Monetary policy is discussed in detail in the subsequent section. For now it su¢ ces to note that a Taylor-type rule is implemented.
For a more general treatment of the interactions of …scal and monetary policy under learning dynamics see Eusepi and Preston (2007) and Evans and Honkapohja (2006) .
General equilibrium requires that the goods market clears, so that
This condition states that output net of adjustment cost is equal to aggregate consumption, determining the equilibrium demand for labor h t at the wage w t = C t . This relation satis…es the log-linear approximationĥ
For later purpose it is useful to characterize the e¢ cient level of output -the level of output that would occur absent nominal rigidities under rational expectations. Under these assumptions, optimal price setting implies the long-linear approximation E t 1Ŷ e t = E t 1ât : Hence predictable movements in the e¢ cient rate of output are entirely determined by the aggregate technology shock. We can use the de…nition of e¢ cient output to characterize the aggregate dynamics of the economy in terms of deviations from the e¢ cient equilibrium.
Nominal bonds are also in zero net supply requiring
Aggregating …rm and household decisions, using (3) and (4) provides
rate of interest. The average expectations operator does not satisfy the law of iterated expectations due to the assumption of completely imperfect common knowledge on the part of all households and …rms. Because agents do not know the beliefs, objectives and constraints of others in the economy, they cannot infer aggregate probability laws. This is the property of the irreducibility of long horizon forecasts noted by Preston (2005) .
The Monetary Authority
The monetary authority minimizes a standard quadratic loss function under the assumption that agents have rational expectations. This approach follows a now substantial literature on learning dynamics and monetary policy -see Howitt (1992) for the seminal contribution and Bullard and Mitra (2002), Evans and Honkapohja (2003) and Preston (2004 Preston ( , 2006 , inter alia, for subsequent contributions -motivated by the question of robustness of standard policy advice to small deviations from the rational expectations assumption. For alternative treatments of policy design that take into account private agent learning see Gaspar, Smets, and Vestin (2005) and Molnar and Santoro (2005) .
The optimal policy problem is
subject to the constraints
which are the model implied aggregate demand and supply equations under rational expectations. 8 The weight x > 0 determines the relative priority given to output gap stabilization.
A second order accurate approximation to household welfare in this model can be shown to imply a speci…c value for x : Because this is not central to our conclusions, and because this more general notation permits indexing a broader class of policy rules, we adopt this objective function unless otherwise noted.
The …rst order condition under optimal discretion is
Hence optimal policy dictates interest rates to be adjusted so that predictable movements in in ‡ation are negatively related to those in the output gap. 9 This targeting rule combined with the structural relations (8) and (9) can be shown to determine the rational expectations equilibrium paths fi t ; t ; x t g as linear functions of the exogenous state variables r e t 1 ;^ t 1 . Without loss of generality, and to make the analysis as simple and transparent as possible, we assume that the exogenous processes to be determined by r e t = r r e t 1 + "
where 0 < r ; < 1 and (" r t ; " t ) independently and identically distributed random variables, with autoregressive coe¢ cients known to households and …rms.
10 Under these assumptions
delineates the desired state contingent evolution of nominal interest rates required to implement the optimal equilibrium.
Following Svensson and Woodford (2005) , rather than adopting the targeting rule (10) directly as the policy rule, we instead assume the central bank implements policy according to the nominal interest rate rule
where > 0. The central bank is assumed to observe private forecasts -through survey data -or to have an identical internal forecasting model. This rule has the property that if beliefs converge to the underlying rational expectations equilibrium then it is consistent 9 Policies under optimal commitment could similarly be analyzed without substantial di¤erences in the conclusions of this paper. However, because such policies introduce history dependence, analytical conditions are somewhat problematic and we therefore take the case of discretion for convenience.
10 This assumption is innocuous and readily generalized.
with implementing optimal policy under a rational expectations equilibrium. This follows immediately from observing in this case that An immediate implication is that model dynamics are self-referential: the evolution of …rm and household beliefs in ‡uence the realizations of observed macroeconomic variables.
Learning induces time variation in the data generating process describing in ‡ation, output and nominal interest rates. The central technical question concerns the conditions under which beliefs converge to those that would obtain in the model under rational expectations, in which case the data generating process characterizing the evolution of macroeconomic variables is time invariant. Convergence is assessed using the notion of expectational stability outlined in Evans and Honkapohja (2001) .
A more fundamental implication of this self-referential property is that it permits the analysis of communication in stabilizing expectations. In a rational expectations analysis, expectations are pinned down by construction of the equilibrium. By analyzing a model that permits small deviations in beliefs -which imply uncertainty about the statistical processes characterizing the evolution of prices -from this traditional benchmark, the value of certain types of information regarding the monetary policy process in stabilizing expectations can be clearly and fruitfully evaluated.
Forecasting
This section outlines the beliefs of agents in our benchmark analysis in the case of no communication. As additional information is communicated to households and …rms, the structure of beliefs will change accordingly. These modi…cations will be noted as they arise, with an illustrative example given below. 
where ! 0 denotes the constant and ! 1 is de…ned as ! 1 = 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4
where the agents are assumed to know the autocorrelation coe¢ cients of the shocks but estimate the other parameters (with time subscripts being dropped for convenience). Finally e t represents an i.i.d. estimation error. Hence agents are attempting to learn the average value of observed macroeconomic data and also a set of slope coe¢ cients describing the reduced form relationship between these macroeconomic objects and fundamental disturbances to the economy.
This paper models communication as information about the dynamics of nominal interest rates. As an example of communication, suppose the central bank credibly announces that monetary policy will be conducted so that in ‡ation, output and nominal interest rates will on average be zero in deviations from steady state. Then the model implication is that agents know this with certainty and impose this restriction on their regression model. Hence ! 0;t 1 = 0 and agents need only learn a subset of coe¢ cients relevant to the reduced form dynamics of macroeconomic aggregates. This captures well the idea that communicating characteristics of the monetary policy strategy is an attempt to manage the evolution of expectations.
At the end of period t 1 agents form their forecast about the future evolution of the macroeconomic variables given their current beliefs about reduced form dynamics. Given the vector Z t 1 , expectations T + 1 periods ahead are calculated aŝ
for each T > t 1 and where I 5 is a (5 5) identity matrix. To evaluate expectations in the optimal decision rules of households and …rms, note that the discounted in…nite-horizon forecasts areÊ
which can be expressed aŝ
are, respectively, a (5 1) vector and (5 5) matrix.
Expectational Stability
Substituting for the expectations in the equations for the output gap, in ‡ation and the nominal interest rate, permits aggregate dynamics of the economy to be written as
with obvious notation. This expression makes clear the dependency of observed dynamics on agents'beliefs about the future evolution of the economy. Moreover, it implicitly de…nes the mapping between agents'beliefs and the actual coe¢ cients describing observed dynamics as T (! 0;t 1 ; ! 1;t 1 ) = ( 0 (! 0;t 1 ; ! 1;t 1 ) ; 1 (! 1;t 1 )) :
A rational expectations equilibrium is a …xed point of this mapping. For such rational expectations equilibria we are interested in asking under what conditions does an economy with learning dynamics converge to each equilibrium. Using stochastic approximation methods, Marcet and Sargent (1989b) and Evans and Honkapohja (2001) show that conditions for convergence are characterized by the local stability properties of the associated ordinary
where denotes notional time. The rational expectations equilibrium is said to be expec- 12 Standard results for ordinary di¤erential equations imply that a …xed point is locally asymptotically stable if all eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix D [T (! 0 ; ! 1 ) (! 0 ; ! 1 )] have negative real parts (where D denotes the di¤erentiation operator and the Jacobian understood to be evaluated at the relevant rational expectations equilibrium).
Benchmark Properties
To ground the analysis, and provide a well known comparative benchmark, the stability properties of the model under rational expectations can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 1 Under rational expectations, the model given by equations (7), (6) and (11) has a unique bounded solution if > 1. This is an example of the Taylor principle. If nominal interest rates are adjusted su¢ ciently to ensure appropriate variation in the real rate of interest, then expectations are well anchored.
This feature along with other robustness properties noted by Levin, Wieland, and Williams (2003) and Batini and Haldane (1999) have lead to advocacy of forecast-based instrument rules for the implementation of monetary policy. See also Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998, 2000) which adduce empirical evidence for such interest rate reaction functions. In contradistinction, under learning dynamics the model developed here has strikingly di¤erent predictions for the evolution of household and …rm expectations.
Proposition 2 Consider the economy under learning dynamics where the central bank does not communicate the policy rule.
(i) The REE is unstable under learning provided
where ( ) > 0, lim !1 ( ) = 0 and lim !0 ( ) = 1. Hence:
(ii) If ! 1, then the REE is unstable under learning for every and :
(iii) IF ! 0, then the REE is stable under learning for every and :
For many reasonable parameter values, the optimal policy under rational expectations cannot be implemented with learning and no communication, rendering the economy prone to self-ful…lling expectations. Indeed, standard parameterizations invariably take the household's discount rate to be near unity. In the limit ! 1 instability occurs for all parameter values underscoring the importance of stabilizing long-term expectations. Conversely, as becomes small, ( ) becomes unboundedly large, guaranteeing stability of the equilibrium. Intuitively, as increases the future becomes more important in agents'consumption plans and a correct prediction of the future path of the nominal interest rate, together with predictions about the output gap and in ‡ation, becomes crucial for stability. This result underscores the importance of modelling the dependence of agents'decisions on expectations about macroeconomic conditions over the entire decision horizon.
It is the interaction of policy delays and learning dynamics that leads to instability. Consider a sudden increase in in ‡ation expectations. This initially engenders higher output and in ‡ation. The central bank's policy response occurs with a delay because it has imperfect information about the state of the economy. Because of learning dynamics, when an increase in the nominal interest rate does occur, it fails to curb the initial increase in expected and actual in ‡ation. Private agents fail to correctly anticipate the future policy stance so that the initial increase in the policy instrument has limited e¤ect on aggregate activity, in turn validating initial beliefs. Section 5 further explores the dynamics of belief formation under various assumptions about the degree of communication.
Two additional points are worth noting. First, under reasonable parameterizations an increase in renders the equilibrium less stable -for example if > (1 ) and x < 1.
Moreover, a central bank that does not communicate has incentives to be less aggressive to in ‡ation and more to output. As an example a policy rule with < 1 and x su¢ ciently high will yield stability under learning. Why is x important for expectations stabilization?
Recall that prices depend on the expected sequence of output gaps into the inde…nite future. As output gap expectations increase prices move accordingly a¤ecting future in ‡ation expectations. Thus the expected output gap becomes a better indicator of future in ‡ation expectations. By responding to expected output gap the central bank can 'move ahead' of in ‡ation expectations, preventing instability. The drawback of this policy choice is that values of x that help preventing self-ful…lling expectation do not necessarily coincide with the central bank preferences for in ‡ation and output-gap stabilization.
Second, and related, the observation that policies giving greater weight to output gap stabilization are less likely to be prone to instability has relevance for recent debate on the merits of simple policy rules. For example, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2005) demonstrate in medium-scale model of the kind developed by Smets and Wouters (2002) , that optimal monetary policy can be well approximated by a simple nominal interest rate rule that responds to contemporaneous observations of in ‡ation. Moreover, policies that respond to the output gap are undesirable, since over-estimating the optimal elasticity by even small amounts can lead to a sharp deterioration in household welfare. What the above result demonstrates, is that in a world characterized by small departures from rational expectations, the policymaker may face a trade-o¤: strong responses to the output gap may reduce welfare, but they may protect against even more deleterious consequences from self-ful…lling expectations.
This …nding contrasts with Ferrero (2004) and Orphanides and Williams (2005) which
argue that under learning policy should be more aggressive in response to in ‡ation. The di¤erence in conclusion stems from the central bank's knowledge of the state of the economy.
In the present analysis, the central bank has imperfect information about the current state and may therefore have reason to be cautious.
Eliminating Policy Delays
This striking instability result naturally raises the question of how can expectations be managed more e¤ectively in the pursuit of macroeconomic stabilization. The model has two key information frictions. First, the central bank responds to information about the true state of the economy with a delay. This is an implication of the forecast-based monetary policy rule.
Second, households and …rms have an incomplete model of the macroeconomy and need to learn about the reduced-form dynamics of aggregate prices. It follows that agents are faced with statistical uncertainty about the true data generating process describing the evolution of nominal interest rates. Resolving these informational frictions may mitigate expectations driven instability.
In regards to the policymaker's uncertainty, suppose the central bank has perfect information about current in ‡ation and the output gap. It can then implement the policy rule
which is closer in spirit to the policy proposed by Taylor (1993) . The following result obtains. These forecasts can be used directly by the private sector in making spending and pricing decisions. Since they are by construction consistent with the adopted policy rule, if agents base decisions directly on these announced forecasts, it must be equivalent to households and …rms knowing the policy rule and constructing the forecast path of nominal interest rates independently, subject to the caveats now noted.
The Value of Communication
To keep the analysis as simple as possible, we assume that the private sector and the central bank share the same expectations about the future evolution of the economy. This assumption is dispensable. Analyzing a model in which the central bank communicates its reaction function but in which there is disagreement about the forecasts is feasible though beyond the scope of this paper. See Honkapohja and Mitra (2005) for an analysis of a New Keynesian model in which only one period ahead forecasts matter and conditions under which heterogeneous forecasts deliver the same stability results.
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Regardless of how this communication strategy is implemented, we assume that the central bank is perfectly credible, in the sense that the public fully incorporates announced information in their forecasts without veri…cation. Issues related to cheap talk, as analyzed by Stein (1989) and Moscarini (forthcoming) for example, are not considered. We assume the central bank is able to fully communicate its reaction function without noise so the market fully understands its policy goals and strategy, both in the current period and into the inde…nite future.
Imposing knowledge of the policy rule on households' and …rms' forecasting modelsor knowledge of the central bank's conditional forecast path fE t 1 i T g T t -is equivalent to substituting this equilibrium restriction into the aggregate demand equation to give
The remaining model equations are unchanged with the exception of beliefs. Since nominal interest rates need not be forecast, an agent's vector autoregression model is estimated on the modi…ed state vector Proposition 4 Assume the bank communicates under perfect credibility the interest rate forecast
or, equivalently, the policy rule (11). Then the REE is stable if > 1.
Communication of the policy rule completely mitigates instability under learning dynamics -even though the central bank and the private sector have incomplete information about the state of the economy. The result shows how communicating the reaction function helps shape beliefs about future policy, making it possible for agents to anticipate future policy.
As an example, suppose in ‡ation expectations increase. Under full communication, agents' conditional forecasts of in ‡ation and nominal interest rates are coordinated according to (11).
They therefore correctly anticipate that higher in ‡ation leads to a higher path for nominal interest rates -one that is su¢ cient to raise the projected path of the real interest rate.
As a result, output decreases, leading to a decrease in in ‡ation, which in turn mitigates the initial increase in expectations, leading the economy back to equilibrium. In absence of communication, an agents'conditional forecasts for nominal interest rates and in ‡ation give rise to projected falls in future real interest rates, generating instability. Section 5 discusses further intuition of how communication stabilizes expectations.
Strategy 2
Now suppose the central bank only announces the set of variables relevant to monetary policy deliberations so that agents do not know the precise restriction that holds between nominal interest rates, in ‡ation and the output gap. Furthermore, suppose that while agents do not know the policy coe¢ cients, they do know that nominal interest rates are set according to a linear function of these variables. By limiting knowledge of private agents about the monetary policy process relative to the benchmark full-information analysis several aspects of central bank communication can be captured. First, uncertainty about parameters and forecasts can be interpreted as a constraint on the communication ability of the central bank. This re ‡ects the fact that the policy decision is the outcome of a complex process, the details of which are often too costly to communicate. 14 Second, the central bank might face credibility issues, leading the private sector to want to verify announced policies. Third, complete announcement might not be the optimal choice for the central bank, given the agent's learning process.
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This partial information about the policy process can be incorporated by households and …rms in the following two-step forecasting model. First, using the history of available data, agents run a regression of nominal interest rates on expected in ‡ation and the output gap
This yields estimates of the coe¢ cients of the policy rule. 16 Notice that, as shown in the appendix, we consider the more general case where the regression is conducted according to 14 See Mishkin (2004) . 15 A discussion of the optimal policy under learning is left for further research. 16 There is an important sublety in specifying this regression. We assume that private agents include a …xed constant and do not explicitly allow for a stochastic constant as in (11). This avoids multicollinearity problems in the case of convergent learning dynamics, given the presence of only two shocks. recursive instrumental variable estimation, allowing for the possibility that private sector and central bank forecasts are di¤erent or that the central bank can communicate its expectations with noise.
As a second step, given these estimates, agents proceed in the same manner as strategy 1: they forecast the future paths of the output gap and in ‡ation rate and then use the estimated policy rule to construct a set of nominal interest rate forecasts.
Proposition 5 If households and …rms understand the variables upon which nominal interest rate decisions are conditioned, then the REE is stable under learning if > 1.
Thus the central bank need not disclose all details of the monetary policy strategy. It is su¢ cient that information be given regarding the endogenous variables relevant to the determination of policy and the functional form of the rule -but not its parameterization. Credible public pronouncements of this kind, combined with a su¢ cient history of data, provide agents with adequate information to verify the implemented rule. And despite the estimation uncertainty attached to the policy coe¢ cients, local to the rational expectations equilibrium of interest, expectations are nonetheless well anchored relative to the no communication case.
Indeed, this communication strategy is equally useful in protecting against instability from expectations formation as strategy 1 in which agents know the true policy coe¢ cients. Of course, the out-of-equilibrium dynamics would di¤er across these two strategies -the estimation uncertainty being relevant to the true data generating process of macroeconomic variables -which in turn has welfare implications. Analyzing such implications is beyond the scope of this paper.
Strategy 3
Over the past two decades numerous countries have adopted in ‡ation targeting as a framework for implementing monetary policy. A central part of this monetary policy strategy has been the clear articulation of a numerical target for in ‡ation. As a …nal exercise, we consider a communication strategy that conveys not only the desired average outcome for in ‡ation -that is the in ‡ation target -but also the associated values for nominal interest rates and the output gap. Given our analysis is in deviations from steady state, these three values are clearly zero. As discussed in section 3, given this knowledge agents no longer need to estimate a constant in their regression model, leading to more accurate forecasts of the future path of nominal interest rates.
Proposition 6 Assume the central bank communicates only the in ‡ation target = 0 and the associated values for the output gap and nominal interest rates, x = i = 0.
1. De…ne = max ( u ; r ) and let ! 1. Then the REE is unstable under learning if (17) holds;
2. Let ! 1. Then the REE is unstable under learning if
where~ ( ) > 0,~ (1) = 0.
Economies subject to persistent shocks may be prone to expectations driven instability.
Indeed, the stability conditions for the no communication case obtain for cost-push or e¢ cient rate disturbance processes having roots near unity. This result nicely demonstrates a fundamental insight of rational expectations analysis: it is not enough to announce an in ‡ation target -one must also announce how one will achieve this target. Only by providing information regarding the systematic component of monetary policy can expectations be e¤ectively managed.
To further interpret this condition a graphical analysis is useful. The model is calibrated with = 0:99, = 10 and = 2. Figure 1 plots three contours demarcating stability and instability regions, below and above respectively, as functions of the parameters ( ; x ). Each contour is indexed by the maximum autoregressive coe¢ cient in the two disturbance processes.
Finally, the dashed line indicates the weight on output gap stabilization that is optimal from a welfare theoretic perspective. It is immediate that as the maximum eigenvalue increases the set of parameter values for which expectations are stabilized considerably narrows. For a given degree of price stickiness, as the persistence in exogenous disturbance rises a much stronger response to the output gap is required. An implication is that the optimal policy may not be implementable if the policy maker is concerned with prohibiting self-ful…lling expectations.
Similarly, for a given weight on output gap stabilization, only in economies with less ‡exible To characterized beliefs, we study the associated ordinary di¤erential equation of the EStability mapping. Figure 2 plots the local dynamics of the agents'estimates of ! ;r and ! i;r -the estimated slope coe¢ cients on the e¢ cient rate disturbance. Given a su¢ ciently large sample of data, the evolution of these belief coe¢ cients are arbitrarily well described by the linear ordinary di¤erential equation
where
This represents the …rst order dynamics of the ODE (14) whose eigenvalues determine EStability properties. The economy is initially in the deterministic steady state (with no shocks occurring in the simulation). We then perturb the beliefs of private agents, making the initial estimate of the in ‡ation coe¢ cient, ! r , higher than its rational expectations value. This can be interpreted as an increase in in ‡ation expectations or equivalently an expectational error on the part of agents. Given the weak initial e¤ect on in ‡ation, and therefore in ‡ation expectations, the central bank keeps increasing the nominal interest rate until in ‡ation expectations start declining. As the response of in ‡ation expectations is inertial, the central bank tends to overtighten. Hence in ‡ation expectations, and as a consequence in ‡ation, keep decreasing until they become negative, overshooting their rational expectations equilibrium values. With low interest rates and low in ‡ation expectations a new cycle starts. The central bank eases its policy stance but expectations react with a delay, leading to excessively low nominal interest rates and high in ‡ation expectations. Agents'beliefs eventually converge though the speed of convergence depends on the chosen parameters. Figure 4 shows that expected in ‡ation and the expected interest rate rise and fall together until they converge back to the equilibrium. There is no overshooting. This is explained by market participants correctly anticipating that the interest rate will be higher in the future in response to higher in ‡ation expectations. The anticipated positive response of the nominal interest rate increases the expected real interest rate with a reduction in output that further reduces in ‡ation expectations. Notice also that the increase in the actual interest rate is lower than the case of no communication. Moreover, convergence in beliefs is monotonic -there are no oscillatory dynamics in expectations. This underscores that managing expectations, even in the case of stability under learning dynamics, has stabilization bene…ts. This is one of the central contributions of Orphanides and Williams (2005) Finally, if the central bank only announces the desired in ‡ation target, economies with persistent shocks will frequently be prone to expectations driven ‡uctuations. This makes clear that it is not su¢ cient to announce desired objectives -one must also announce the systematic component of policy which describes how these objective will be achieved.
A Appendix

A.1 Propositions and Proofs
Proposition 2: Under no communication, the REE is unstable under learning if
where ( ) > 0; (1) = 0.
Proof: The ODE (14) evaluated at the rational expectations equilibrium, can be decomposed in four independent sub-systems. The …rst includes the three constant terms,
where J ! 0 contains a sub-matrix of the Jacobian, evaluated at the REE equilibrium. The second and the third include the coe¢ cients to the exogenous shocks,
where ! r = ! xr ! r ! ir 0 . Finally, the fourth includes the coe¢ cients on the endogenous variables vec ( _ ! e ) = J ! e I 9 vec (! e ) ;
In order to show the instability result, it is su¢ cient to evaluate the real parts of the eigenvalues of the matrix J ! 0 I 3 . Necessary conditions for stability under learning are
Trace J ! 0 I 3 < 0
Determinant J ! 0 I 3 > 0
and Sm J ! 0 I 3 Trace J ! 0 I 3 + Determinant J ! 0 I 3 > 0;
where Sm denotes the sum of all principle minors of J ! 0 I 3 . The trace can be calculated as 1 < 0 while the determinants is
2
( 1) + (1 ) which is positive under the assumption > 1.
Evaluating (24) It is straightforward to show that the coe¢ cients on the endogenous variables converge to their values under rational expectations. These results are available on request.
Proposition 4: Assume the bank communicates under perfect credibility the interest rate forecast E CB t 1 i T 1 T =t or, equivalently, the policy rule (11). Then the REE is stable if > 1.
Proof:
The system has lower dimensionality, since agents do not have to forecast the nominal interest rate equation. Given that they know the steady state of the system, stability under learning is governed by the dynamics of agent's estimates of the shocks'coe¢ cients and the lagged endogenous variables coe¢ cients (also in this case they evolve as three separate subsystems). Consider …rst the stability of the coe¢ cients. We have J ! u I 2 =F ( u ) and J ! r I 2 =F ( r ) so that instability can be determined by analyzingF ( ). The trace of F ( ) is negative ( + 2 + 1)
( 1 + ) < 0 and the determinant can be expressed as
( 1 + ) 2 so that it is positive provided > 1. FinallyJ ! e I 6 can be shown to have stable eigenvalue for every parameter values.
Proposition 5: If households and …rms understand the variables on which nominal interest rate decisions are conditioned on, then the REE is stable under learning if > 1.
Proof: The Actual law of Motion can be re-written as:
The evolution of^ is described by: 
